Contracting services in the public sector with private for-profi t and non-profi t fi rms is one of the most prevalent types of alternative service-delivering arrangements. Concerning the positive potential of contracting, the relevant literature proposes that contracting may, but need not, improve individual choice, cost-eff ectiveness and the quality of delivery, equity and to some extent also expenditure control. On the other hand, many authors provide important arguments describing weak points of contracting and some risks connected with contracting services in the public sector. Th e main "internal" reason why contracting does not produce the expected results and even creates perverse eff ects in the eff ectiveness and quality of contracted services, is the improper implementation of contract management. Th is paper seeks to answer the question of what factors account for success in contracting for services in the public sector by testing the relationship between contracting performance and selected factors connected with contract management such as competition, exante evaluation of bidders, contract monitoring, contract duration, contract payment and joint problem solving and communication between the principal and the agent. Th is study uses a quantitative approach to investigate the research question and to analyze the original collected survey data from our own research.
Introduction
Our data (Meričková, Nemec and Vítek 2005 , Meričková, Nemec and Ochrana 2008 , Meričková, Nemec, Sičáková-Beblavá and Beblavý 2010 and data of other authors for the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Balážová 2006; Beblavý and Sičáková-Beblavá 2006; Majlingová and Šagát 2006 , Sičáková-Beblavá and Beblavý 2007 , Ochrana 2007 Pavel 2007) evaluating outcomes from contracting (we use this term as a synonym for external delivery of public services -like waste disposal) and outsourcing (we use this term as a synonym for external delivery of internal services in public organizations -like cleaning) processes in the public sector indicate that the use of these instruments in our conditions does not deliver the expected results. Contracting and outsourcing are controversial instruments already because of their character, and their cons might be exaggerated in less developed countries -this aspect is demonstrated in the fi rst part of our paper. At the end of this fi rst part, we will provide selected evidence about results of contracting and outsourcing in our conditions.
Results from contracting and outsourcing (as a binding agreement in which a government (principal / provider) pays a private fi rm or non-profi t organization (agent / producer) to deliver a specifi c level and quality of service) are determined by many "internal" and "external" factors determining their success. Th e focus of the core part of our paper is the evaluation of contract-management factors determining the rate of success of contracting and outsourcing on the basis of the Slovak sample.
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Theoretical background
Contracting out public services is a frequently implemented market-type solution in the public sector, implemented especially at the local government level. Under this arrangement, government retains the responsibility for the provision of the service, but hires private fi rms to produce the service. Citizens as customers, through their taxes or user fees, pay the government, which in turn pays the contractor.
Contracting stems from the "organizational decision to make or buy a good or service" (Prager 1994, 176) . Modern public organizations are expected to decide whether to produce goods and services internally or to contract them out. Th e guiding principle behind the choice is to increase effi ciency, while maintaining or increasing the quality of the delivery of a public service (Engelbeck 2004; Epstein 1984 ).
As noted above, contracting has the potential to improve effi ciency without sacrifi cing quality, compared with direct supply by public organizations, so long as certain conditions are met. Th e potential benefi cial impacts of contracting are connected mainly with increasing individual choice and improved cost-eff ectiveness, quality and equity (Bailey 1999; Øvretveit 1995; Lane 2000 and many others) . However, such potential was never fully confi rmed by hard data, and many empirical studies (e.g. Bel and Costas 2006) cannot even confi rm the eff ect of the mode of production on costs, which has been the main positive argument for contracting. Moreover some authors stress the many barriers and also negative impacts connected with the use of competition and contracting (Bailey 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Lane 2000 and many others). For example Lowery (1998) discusses three types of quasi-market failure, two of them, market-formation failure and preference error, are clearly connected with contracting out. Market-formation failure results from a lack of competition, oft en due to the small number of potential suppliers for many public services. If privatization merely substitutes a private monopoly for a public one, then savings will likely disappear aft er the initial contract. Preferenceerror failure is connected with limited information. Later on in the text, we specifically introduce two core theoretical concepts important for evaluating the potential of contracting out: principal-agent theory (Arrow 1985; Cooper 2003; Kettl 1993; More 1984; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1986) and the theory of transaction costs (Ferris and Graddy 1996; Prager 1994; Hirsch 1991) .
Th e issue of factors determining the success of contracting / outsourcing is not new in the economic literature. Th e main focus of existing studies is on the following aspects:
• the degree of competition for awarding the contract (Savas 1987; Kettl 1993; Greene 2002; Hodge 2000, Pavel and Beblavá 2008) ,
• the quality of ex-ante evaluation of the contractor / agent (Rehfuss 1989; Marlin 1984; Romzek and Johnston 2002) ,
• the clear defi nition of the contracted / outsourced service -contract specifi cation (Rehfuss 1989 , Marlin 1984 ,
• the quality of contract monitoring (Rehfuss 1989; Marlin 1984; Prager 1994; Seidenstat 1999; Brown and Potoski 2003; Hefetz and Warner 2004 ),
• sanctions (DeHoog 1990; Macneil 1978 ),
• the experience of the public body / government / principal responsible for contracting / outsourcing with contract management (DeHoog 1990; Rehfuss 1989; Romzek and Johnston 2002) ,
• the technical knowledge of the contracted service (Kettl 1993; Meričková 2010) .
Principal-agent theory and contracting
Establishing and maintaining a legal contractual relationship between principal and agent is connected with many problems and risks. According to Shetterly (1998, 23) , this process occurs in three phases; pre-solicitation, contractor selection and contract management. All these phases may be connected with the situation when the action and the information of agents are not directly observable by principals. Arrow (1985, 37) , for example, speaks of "moral hazard or the problem of hidden action and adverse selection or the problem of hidden information. "
Moral hazard can occur because the behavior of the private partner is imperfectly controlled. When behavior is imperfectly controlled, it creates a situation where either shirking in performance of duties or inappropriate actions by the private partner adversely impacts the goals of the public partner.
In the adverse-selection problem, the private fi rm has some information that is not shared with the public-sector organization and uses the information to make decisions that aff ect the public organization. However, the public organization cannot check to see if the information is serving the public interest. For example, the public-sector organization wants to hire the best private partner. But the private fi rm will know more about their own qualifi cations than will the public-sector organization. Th is information asymmetry may render impossible a full ex-ante evaluation of the private off ers. Bailey (1999, 290-292) examines the eff ects of such publicservice-contracting problems.
According to More, "Th e principal must weave these interrelated components into a contractual framework that, in mitigating the informational asymmetries and structuring rewards, prompts the agent to behave as the principal himself would under whatever conditions might prevail" (More 1984, 756-757) .
Transactions costs and contracting
Th e transaction costs associated with contracting out and the relationship of these costs to benefi ts derived from external delivery should be included in the complexity of the contracting relationship. When contracting for services, governments incur contracting costs which are implicitly or explicitly part of the make-or-buy decision. Th e transaction costs of contracting are of two types: "those associated with the contract formation stage and those associated with the contract performance stage" (Hirsch 1991, 56-57) .
Changing service delivery involves changes to production systems and changes to management systems. Th ese changes require establishing new performance criteria, constructing monitoring systems and changing job responsibilities, reducing the number of public employees. Activities such as craft ing requests for proposals, establishing systems and protocols for reviewing proposals and selecting vendors, craft ing contracts, and negotiating with vendors must be undertaken be-fore the internal delivery system can be taken off -line. Th ese transaction costs of switching modes of service delivery or costs of acquiring the services in the market are important to the make-or-buy decision. Diff erent services have diff erent levels of transaction-cost factors, in part determined by asset specifi city and ease of measurement explained by the transaction-cost theory noted above.
Contracting out in transitional countries
Th e theory summarized above indicates that in developed countries, contracting may, but need not, improve the performance of the public sector. Th e fi nal outcome depends on local conditions, including the capacity of the implementing body to execute the contracting process.
In transitional countries, the situation is much more complicated. Several socio-economic preconditions for successful contracting are insuffi ciently developed. In such a situation -due to non-mature markets and democratic institutions, in developing countries internalization may be a desirable decision. In the following text we indicate selected important specifi cs of developing versus developed countries.
Competition
Potentially competitive markets may still not be well developed, but characterized by monopolistic or oligopolistic structures and behavior. Given this, it is rather optimistic to expect a comprehensive supply of competitive bids. Under these circumstances, the argument about possible unit cost savings is far more controversial than in developed countries.
Corruption
It is diffi cult to measure corruption, but all data indicate higher risks of corruption in developing transition countries compared to developed countries. Th e probably most frequently used Transparency International CPI indexes describe perceptions of corruption, not direct measurements (Table 1) . Th is methodology is sensitive to the level of awareness -when respondents become more aware of the problem, results worsen.
Data from "Enterprise Surveys" are also signifi cant. Table 2 exhibits data from Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and a comparison with Estonia, the best-performing new EU member state. As well as highlighting the problem of corruption, the table also shows that generally the scale of economic corruption is not decreasing as transition continues. Only the indicator for bribes for getting things done is moving in the desired direction. Source: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ A -% of fi rms expecting to give an informal payment to public offi cials (to get things done) J -% of fi rms expecting to give gift s to secure a government contract K -Value of gift expected to secure government contract (% of contract) L -% of fi rms identifying corruption as a major constraint M -% of fi rms believing the court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted
Democracy
Expectations at the beginning of transition were optimistic, but today it is clear that the twenty-year CEE transition period has not seen a sustained development of democratic institutions and norms.
Recent scandals in the Czech Republic (Veci Verejne) and in Slovakia (Gorila) comprehensively reported by both national and international media, indicate that the connections between economic lobbies and public offi cials are too close -exactly as Stiglitz (1997, 28) warned when discussing the limited capacity of politicians to serve the public interest (see also Šebo and Maceják 2008) .
Other problems are the lack of a sense of individual responsibility, paternalism and fi scal illusion that remain important features of citizens' behavior. In Slovakia, 67 % of respondents believed that their problems should be solved by the state (Bunčak et al. 2009 ). In the Czech Republic, the introduction of co-payments in health care signifi cantly infl uenced regional elections in 2009, with social democrats using them as their main stick to beat the governing party. In both countries, many people act as though their social benefi ts are costless.
Quality of the rule of law
Th e possible success of outsourcing is also connected to the quality of the rule of law. If the state switches its role from provider to regulator, effi ciency improvements are impossible where regulatory guidelines do not exist, and where the law is not respected. At present, it is clear that government offi cials do not routinely respect the law, and, perhaps the core problem, citizens do not require them to do so.
Th e administrative basis is also inadequate. Outsourcing occurs with no explanations, recommendations or guidelines for users. Th e countries have only recently started to switch to accrual accounting rules, but this is still insuffi cient because full cost accounting is confi ned to only a few public organizations, for example universities and hospitals.
To be eff ective, contracting also needs to be supported by new control and audit approaches that focus on legality and results. But the current systems of publicsector control / auditing employed in most if not all CEE countries predominantly adhere to the old-fashioned administrative procedural type of control. New laws on fi nancial control were passed by national parliaments under pressure from Brussels, but in reality eff ective mechanisms to measure and create real effi ciency, eff ectiveness and quality in public-sector institutions and processes are still missing (Pavel 2006 ).
Contracting and outsourcing in Slovakia and Czechia and its results
We have mapped contracting and outsourcing processes in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia for more than a dozen years. Our fi ndings indicate that many local public services are contracted out and many internal services are outsourced to external suppliers. Tables 3 and 4 describe the situation in outsourcing, Table 5 deals with contracting local services. All data clearly indicate that outsourcing internal services and external delivery of local public services is a very frequent solution both in Slovakia and Czechia. Our fi ndings also indicate that results from outsourcing and contracting are contradictory. As an illustration Table 6 shows one sample of data with unclear results; the same picture appears in all other samples. 
Quality of contract management in outsourcing and contracting in Slovakia
Our data indicate that outsourcing and contracting are frequent, but deliver very mixed results. In such a situation, the attempt to assess factors determining the existing situation is obvious. As indicated, in our paper, we focus on evaluating contract-management factors. Th e absence of systemic contract management is one of the core purposes for failures of contracting / outsourcing (Hodge 2000; Sclar 2000; Brudney et al. 2005; Kamerman and Kahn 1989) . To collect data, we used the sample (Table 7) .
For the purposes of this concrete research of the quality of contract management in outsourcing and contracting processes, we decided to use the following set of factors (determined by the Deplhi method):
x 1 -level of competitiveness of the award, x 2 -defi nition of the procured services / contract specifi cations, All above-mentioned factors have qualitative character, thus we transformed them into quantitative data as follows (Table 8 ) and used them as described in Table 9 .
Table 8
Conversion to quantitative data Right to request improvements 30
Other 0
x 11 -Length of contract One year or less 100 1-2 years 70
2-5 years 30
Unlimited 0
x 12 -method of payment to supplier
Performance payment 100
Mixed performance and lump-sum payment 50
Lump-sum payment 0 Limited or none at all 0 x 14 -The quality of cooperation between principal and agent is high.
Fully agree 100
Agree 50
Disagree 0
Fully disagree 0
x 15 -The level of trust between principal and agent is high.
Fully disagree 0
Note: own research Note: own research Th e data obtained by our direct research indicate that the quality of contract management is limited. Better results are normally received for soft indicators, where evaluation is based on the subjective opinion / response from the staff involved. A critical level is achieved for main hard indicators, especially the level of competitiveness.
Testing the relationships between factors and results of contracting / outsourcing
In this part, we calculate the Spearman's correlation to test the correlation between a dependent variable (effi ciency of contracting / outsourcing -data not included in this paper) and independent variables -respective quality of contract-management factors. With α = 0.1 we used the statistical systems R and IMB to test the following: Th e results indicate that few statistically signifi cant factors can be identifi ed for contracting. Similarly to other researches, we found that among the most im-portant factors are the level of competitiveness of the award, the monitoring of the services and the form of payment. Th e results for contract duration are not so clear, because for diff erent services, diff erent contract duration is most eff ective (in our research, we expect that shorter contracts have a positive impact on contracting performance).
Concerning outsourcing our research indicates that besides the level of competitiveness, factors like selection criteria, quality of ex-ante evaluation, cooperation and experience also play an important role.
Conclusions
Contracting and outsourcing are relatively frequent solutions in the public sector of developed, but also developing countries. In this paper, we summarize fi ndings from our research. According to our results, contracting and outsourcing may, but need not, improve the effi ciency compared to internal delivery.
Both general and region-specifi c factors determine such a situation. In this paper, we used the Slovak sample to try to measure the impact of qualitative factors (selected by the Delphi method) determining the success in contracting and outsourcing. Th e results indicate that there are several important determinants for success; probably the most important one is the level of competitiveness of award. In light of this fi nding, it is painful to see that the majority of contracts is signed on the basis of non-competitive selection of suppliers, and this trend does not signifi cantly improve, as our data for a period of more than ten years indicate. To change this situation, accountability needs to become a real value in our public-administration systems, and the control has to focus not only on processes but also on results.
